We present results from laboratory experimental elections in which voter information is endogenously provided by candidates and voting is voluntary. We also compare advertisements that are costless to voters with those that reduce voter payo¤s. We …nd that informative advertisements increase voter participation and thus informative campaign advertising "turns out" voters. However, the e¤ect of information is less than that found in previous experimental studies where information is exogenously provided by the experimenter. Furthermore, we …nd that when advertising by winning candidates reduces voter payo¤s, informed voters are less likely to participate, thus are "turned o¤"rather than "turned out."Finally, we discover that candidates tend to overadvertise, and contrary to theoretical predictions, advertise signi…cantly more when voting is voluntary than when it is compulsory.
Two aspects of the American electoral process typically receive considerable attention from public commentators -the turnout rate of American voters and the quantity of campaign advertisement expenditures by candidates. When discussing turnout, a number of pundits conclude that turnout is lower than it "should be" compared to other countries. 1 Similarly, many argue that through …nancing campaigns and campaign advertising, special interest groups exert a disproportionate in ‡uence on elected o¢ cials. 2 Furthermore, often a link is suggested between these two issues; that is, some observers contend that turnout is low partly as a consequence of the in ‡uence of special interest groups who provide campaign contributions. When President George W. Bush signed into law the Shays-Meehan/McCain-Feingold campaign …nance reform bill in 2002, advocates of the reform, such as U.S. Representative Charles Bass, Republican of New Hampshire, touted the bill as having the potential to reduce voter apathy. 34 Testing such an argument in an empirical study of aggregate turnout in US elections from 1960-1998, Cebula (2007) …nds a negative relationship between PAC congressional election campaign contributions and voter participation, controlling for other in ‡uences on turnout during the period. Voters are believed to be "turned o¤" rather than "turned out" by campaign …nance.
In contrast, recent formal theoretical analysis of the e¤ect of information on turnout suggests the opposite relationship might exist if we assume that campaign advertising provides information to voters, which helps clarify their choices. Speci…cally, both decision theoretic models of turnout [Matsusaka (1995) ] and game theoretic ones [Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999)] predict that as a voter becomes more informed he or she is more likely to participate in elections.
In the decision-theoretic model, information directly increases the expected utility from voting, and thus increases the likelihood of participation. In the game theoretic approach, which has been labeled the "Swing Voter's Curse,"uninformed voters are less likely to participate because of the possibility that their uninformed vote might cancel out an informed voter with similar preferences. In both approaches, as overall information levels increase, overall turnout also increases. Thus, if campaign advertising increases the number of informed voters, then turnout 1 should also increase with advertising.
The theoretically predicted relationship between turnout and information has received empirical support in both observational and experimental data. Palfrey and Poole (1987), Wattenberg, et al. (2000) , and Coupe and Noury (2004) show that turnout is positively correlated with voter information levels. However, since becoming informed about politics may be a consequence rather than a cause of political participation, these studies cannot establish a causal link. In a number of recent studies, researchers have exploited situations where political information can be viewed as exogenous in order to determine the impact on turnout of changes in political information. Other studies exploit situations where political information is arguably exogenously determined and …nd a positive e¤ect on voting propensity [see Gentzkow (2005) , Klein and Baum (2001) , Lassen (2005) , and McDermott (2005) ].
The relationship between turnout and information has also been subject to experimental study. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008a,b), hereafter BMP, present the …rst laboratory experimental analysis of Feddersen and Pesendorfer's Swing Voter's Curse Theory. In their experiments, a jar is randomly selected which either has three red balls and nine white balls (called the red jar) or three yellow balls and nine white balls (called the yellow jar). An odd number of subjects randomly select a ball within the jar, revealing its color. If a white ball is revealed, subjects are uninformed about the true jar, but if a red or yellow ball is revealed, subjects learn which jar is correct. Subjects then have a choice whether to abstain or guess which jar is correct. If a majority of the guesses are correct, then the subjects each receive an 80 cent payo¤, if incorrect then the subjects each receive a 5 cent payo¤. The swing voter's curse theory predicts that in these experiments uninformed voters will abstain and informed voters will participate and BMP …nd signi…cant evidence in support of the theory.
In summary, much evidence suggests that the information voters receive in ‡uences their participation decisions, which would suggest that campaign advertising that increases voter information also increases participation in the electoral process as a consequence. Yet, as noted 2 above, a number of commentators contend that campaign advertising funded by special interest groups can cause voters to be apathetic and less likely to participate in the electoral process.
Which view is correct? In this paper we address this question using a laboratory experiment.
Our experiment advances the literature in three directions. First, we endogenize voter information. In the experiment subjects are assigned to be candidates and are able to advertise to subjects who serve as uninformed swing voters, providing them with information about the choices before them.
Second, we use two variants of campaign advertisement …nance schemes -one where advertising by the winning candidate does not reduce voters'payo¤s and one where voters'payo¤s are reduced when campaign advertising occurs which captures the situation where campaign advertising is …nanced by providing interest groups with special favors. The …rst variant of campaign …nancing can be seen as a baseline treatment where we measure only the e¤ect of endogenously provided campaign information on voter choices. It measures the possible "turned out"e¤ect of campaign advertising. The second variant then adds in a cost to voters when winners advertise.
So comparing behavior of voters between the …rst and second variants allows us to measure the "turned o¤" e¤ect of campaign advertising that is seen as costly to voters.
A third important di¤erence in our experiment is that we incorporate more "realistic"details of elections. In our experiments, not only do subjects vote for candidates who are also subjects in the experiment, but we also allow voters to have party allegiances. As in BMP, the subjects are all swing voters and all prefer the same candidate when advertisements are free to voters.
However, the voters'payo¤s depend also on their assignment to a party and whether the winning candidate is in their same party. The voters in preferred candidate's party bene…t more from his or her candidate's selection by the group than the voters not in his or her party when advertising is free, although this advantage is less signi…cant when advertising is costly to voters and candidates advertise.
We …nd that indeed endogenously provided informative campaign advertising increases voter participation, although the e¤ect is much smaller than the information e¤ect found by BMP. We …nd that many uninformed voters participate anyway, suggesting that the voters are in ‡uenced by their party assignment and the endogenous nature of the advertising. Furthermore, we …nd that when the advertising implies that candidates have given away favors to special interest groups, the e¤ect of voter information on turnout is reduced, suggesting that voters are "turned o¤" by campaign advertising …nanced by special interest groups.
Our results also have implications for the e¢ ciency of elections where participation is voluntary. A number of commentators contend that compulsory voting would enhance democracy while others contend that forcing uninformed and uninterested voters in participating can lead to less e¢ cient outcomes. 5 In order to address this debate, we compare our results to identical experiments where participation was mandatory. We …nd that when subjects are allowed the option to abstain (which they are more likely to do when uninformed), the outcome of the election does not result in more e¢ cient outcomes and in fact, when advertising is costless to voters, candidates avertise excessively and there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the informational or economic e¢ ciency. In the next two sections we discuss our theoretical model and experimental design. In Section IV we present our empirical analysis and Section V concludes.
A Model of Endogenous Campaign Advertising with Abstention Voting Model and Information
We consider a game with a set of n voters who choose by plurality rule. We assume that n is even. Two of the voters are candidates A, B: All voters (including the candidates) may abstain, vote for candidate A; or vote for candidate B: There is no cost to voting. The candidate who receives the most votes cast is the winner and ties are determined by random draws. There are also two states of the world. We assume that both states of the world are equally likely. For reasons that will be come clearer below, without loss of generality, we label A the …rst state and B the second. Candidates know the true state of the world but voters can only learn about the true state of the world through campaign advertisements. Candidates can purchase campaign 4 advertisements equal to m j ; j = A; B; which reveal the true state of the world to a randomly selected voter with replacement (who may also be the candidate herself or her opponent). Let m be the total number of ads aired by both candidates. There is no constraint on the number of campaign advertisement a candidate can purchase.
Preferences Candidate Preferences
Candidates' utlities depend only on whether they win an upcoming election and how many campaign advertisements they purchase as given by the following function (where C and c are constants such that C > c > 0): If both things happen, the voter receives a utility of 1 and if neither things happens, the voter gets zero. Formally, the noncandidate voters in this regime have preferences represented by a utility function u(t; w; ) that is a function of their type t 2 fA; Bg; the winner w 2 fA; Bg ; Notice that in the costly information regime for some numbers of campaign ads, voters are no longer in a common value game and do not always prefer a candidate whose identity (A or B) In Figure 1 we demonstrate an example of these payo¤s where A is the true state of the world, m B = 0; and = As the number of noncandidate voters increases and/or the number of campaign advertisements purchased increases, the probability that noncandidate voters are informed increases and the bene…t from abstaining increases and the bene…t from voting for the candidate whose identity matches the uninformed voter's type decreases.
Voting Behavior Summary In summary, for given values of ; n; and m > 0; a voting equilibrium is possible where all uninformed voters abstain. However, it is also possible that an equilibrium exists where all uninformed voters vote for the candidate whose identity matches their type. Again, the possibility of this equilibrium depends on the values of ; n; and m:
Intuitively, when is high and m and n are low, then it is less likely there is an informed voter whose vote will be canceled out by an uninformed voter who votes. That is, when all uninformed voters are voting their type, then only half of the noncandidate voters will be a¤ected by campaign ads (those voters who by seeing an ad would choose to vote for the candidate whose identity does not match their type), and thus there is a smaller probability of canceling out informed voters'choices when uninformed voters participate. These results are stated formally in the following lemmas which are proved in the appendix:
Lemma 1 In the Free Information Regime, if at least one ad is purchased by candidates and noncandidate voters who see ads vote for the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world, there is a critical value of ; 0:5; for a given number of voters n 4 and ads, m, such that if 0 < < ; an optimal strategy for all uninformed voters is to abstain. Furthermore, the greater the number of voters and/or the number of ads, the larger .
Lemma 2
In the Free Information Regime, there is a critical value of ; 0:5; for a given number of voters n 4 and ads, m, such that if 0 < < ; an optimal strategy for all uninformed voters is to vote their identity. Furthermore, the smaller the number of voters and/or the greater the number of ads, the larger .
In our experiments we use = Candidate Advertising Choices Obviously candidates'whose identities do not match the state of the world have a dominant strategy of never advertising as, given voter strategies, advertising increases the probability that voters are informed and the likelihood of losing the election. In contrast, candidates'whose identities match the state of the world have an incentive to advertise. However, this strategy depends on how voters are likely to respond.
When Uninformed Voters Abstain First we consider the case where all uninformed voters abstain as in the swing voter's curse theory. For ease of exposition, assume that the true state of the world is A and candidate B does not advertise: In this situation, if candidate A could be sure that only noncandidate voters see campaign ads, then in equilibrium we would expect him or her to air one and only one ad since it would take only one informed voter for him or her to win for sure given the voter strategies above. However, candidate A cannot be sure that a noncandidate voter will see a given ad, but does know that the probability increases with the number of ads. The probability that a noncandidate voter will observe an ad when candidate A purchases only one ad is given by 1 2 n ; while the probability that a noncandidate voter will observe an ad when the candidate purchases two ads is given by 1 2 n 2 and so on. Thus, …nancial gains for advertising is increasing at a sharply decreasing rate.
Assuming all uninformed voters abstain, informed voters vote the state of the world, and candidate B does not advertise, then candidate A's expected payo¤ under voluntary voting, E(A) is given by the following function:
In our experiments we set C = 15 and c = 0:1: It is straightforward to show that for these parameter values E(A) is maximized when m A = 2 for both n = 22 and n = 24:
When Uninformed Voters Vote Their Party As discussed above, one possible pure strategy voting equilibrium is for all uninformed voters to vote their party identities. When all uninformed voters are voting for their party, this means that ads only change voting behavior and electoral outcomes when voters are both uninformed and not members of the party whose candidate matches the state of the world. As a result candidate optimal advertising choices are di¤erent. Assuming once again that the true state of the world is A and that candidate B does not advertise, candidate A's expected …nancial payo¤, E(A); is given by the following formula:
For the parameter values in the experiments and the number of subjects, candidate A should optimally purchase 7 advertisements to maximize his or her expected payo¤s, which is signi…-cantly greater than the predicted 2 advertisements in this case when all uninformed voters are abstaining. Candidate Ads
Exp. Pay
When n = 24
13
However, as noted above, if ads are greater than 3 or 4 (depending on n), it is no longer optimal for uninformed voters to vote their party identity. So if candidate A purchases 7 ads, uninformed voters will optimally abstain and candidate A is no longer optimizing. So when voting is voluntary, an equilibrium where all uninformed voters vote their party and candidates advertise optimally given that behavior does not exist. Hence, under voluntary voting, theoretically we expect that all uninformed voters will abstain.
Costly Information Regime
As discussed above, when campaign advertisements are costly to voters, noncandidate voters' payo¤s are a¤ected and the noncandidate voters are no longer in a common value game. We can still ignore voters who are also candidates as they will continue to trivially vote for themselves, canceling out. But informed and uninformed noncandidate voters appear to face a complicated choice. Both informed and uninformed noncandidate voters'choices now depend on their beliefs over the total number of ads purchased by the winning candidate.
However, recall that if noncandidate voters follow the strategy of uninformed voters abstaining and informed noncandidate voters voting for the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world, then the optimal campaign advertisement strategy is 2 ads in our experiment.
Candidates'whose identities match the state of the world have no incentive to advertise more than this optimal number even though uninformed subjects do not know the total number of ads purchased. If the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world is following this strategy, then all noncandidate voters receive a greater payo¤ from he or she as in the case when advertising is free and voters are optimizing.
Summary of Equilibrium Predictions
Somewhat counterintuitively, our theoretical analysis suggests that we do not expect any di¤er-ence in behavior of voters or candidates between the two regimes -free information and costly information. In both regimes, we expect candidates whose identity matches the state of the 14 world to purchase 2 ads, for informed voters to vote for the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world, and for uninformed voters to abstain. Theoretically we expect campaign advertising to have a "turn out" e¤ect, but no "turned o¤" e¤ect when advertising is costly to voters since candidates'advertisements are not expected to be large enough.
Experimental Design Basic Procedures
The experiment was implemented entirely on computers using software created speci…cally for election experiments with campaign advertising. Subjects were recruited using an automated recruitment mechanism at George Mason University. Subjects were seated at individual computer terminals and could not see or hear through computer clicking other subjects' choices. 6 We conducted three experimental sessions which we label Sessions 1, 2, and 3. In Sessions One and Two 24 subjects participated and in Session Three 22 subjects participated for a total of 70 subjects. Each session was divided into 16 periods for a total of 48 campaigns and elections and 1,120 voting decisions. A period proceeded as follows -…rst two subjects were randomly chosen to be candidates. Then a one-minute campaign period began in which candidates were allowed to purchase campaign advertisements, which were shown to voters, as we will describe below. After the campaign period ended, all subjects (including the candidates) voted for one of the candidates or abstained. The candidate receiving the majority of votes (ties were broken by a computerized random draw) was declared the winner and the outcome was announced to voters. Then a new period began.
In each period, one candidate was designated as the candidate of the Circle party and the other as the candidate of the Triangle party. Half of the remaining subjects were also randomly assigned to each party as non-candidate voters. Candidates were not only assigned a party but also a Pattern, Striped or Solid. treatment allows us to measure the baseline e¤ect of informative campaign advertising on voter behavior, the "turned out" e¤ect, while the blue token treatment represents a situation where campaign advertisements are provided by special interest groups who then receive favors from the winner that are costly to voters and allows us to measure the "turned o¤"e¤ect. We used a within subjects design; that is, campaign advertising treatments varied by period according to a predetermined pattern. All subjects were told which campaign advertising treatment applied before making choices in a given period and were given in-depth training in understanding the two types of campaign advertisement treatments. Table 1 presents a summary of the three sessions and the campaign advertising treatments by period. By comparing the two campaign advertising treatments we can disentangle the informational e¤ects of campaign spending on voter participation decisions from the e¤ects of having these advertisements paid by special interests. Our within subjects design also allows us to make these comparisons controlling for unobservable subject di¤erences that might confound a between subjects design.
Subject Payo¤s
As noted above, in our experiments we used the parameters C = 15 and c = 0:1 for candidate payo¤s. The payo¤s of noncandidate voters depended on their party assignment and the party and pattern of the winning candidates as well as the number of campaign advertisements of the winning candidate in the blue token treatment such that = 1 7 , as discussed above. The speci…c amounts we used are described below in Table 2 . We report the results working backwards, in the reverse order in which they occurred in the experiments; …rst we discuss election outcomes, then voter behavior, and then candidate choices.
So we begin with an examination of election outcomes. Theoretically we expect that there to be little di¤erence in electoral outcomes between the Red Token and Blue Token treatments since we expect that candidate and voter behavior will be una¤ected. This is not supported by the data. We …nd that in the Red Token treatment Striped candidates win 88.24% of the time and In order to determine if these di¤erences are statistically signi…cant, we compare the informational e¢ ciency of the treatments as to whether voters are choosing the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world. Furthermore, when Blue Tokens are used, if the Striped candidate is advertising 6 or more ads than the Solid candidate, then it is more informationally e¢ cient for the Solid candidate to win. We therefore assigned an informational e¢ ciency rating to wins by the Striped candidate a value of 1, a tie a value of 0.5, and 0 to a win by a Solid candidate in the Red Token periods and the periods in which the Striped candidate ran 5 or less ads than the Solid candidate. When the Striped candidate ran 7 or more ads than the Solid candidate we assigned an informational e¢ ciency rating to wins by the Solid candidate a value of 1, a tie a value of 0.5, and 0 to a win by a Striped candidate. Cases where the Striped candidate advertised exactly 6 ads more than the Solid candidate were assigned 0.5. Table 3 below presents these e¢ ciency results. We …nd a signi…cant decrease in informational e¢ ciency when Blue Tokens are used as compared to Red Tokens. 8 We …nd this decrease in e¢ ciency occurs because of the greater number of wins by the Solid candidate and tie elections. We found a similar relationship in the Blue Token treatments, Solid candidates appeared more likely to make errors, which could be explained by the low probability that these candidates would win election. 
Participation Decisions of Non-Candidate Voters
As discussed in the Introduction, both the decision-theoretic and the game theoretic approaches suggest that uninformed voters will be more likely to abstain. We …nd that indeed this is the case in our data. Of the 152 voters who were not exposed to a campaign advertisement purchased by a Red Token, 37 abstained (24.34%), while of the 212 non-candidate voters who were exposed to a campaign advertisement, only 2 abstained (0.94% in the Blue Token treatment), which is in sharp contrast to BMP's previous experimental analysis of the e¤ect of information on voting and our equilibrium prediction of 100% abstention. BMP (2008) …nd that uninformed voters participated only 15% of the time when there are zero computer voters and both jars are equally likely, the treatment equivalent to our treatment with Red Tokens. 10 As discussed above, our general theoretical equilibrium prediction endogenizing candidate behavior is that all uninformed voters will abstain. However, because of the payo¤ asymmetry in our experiment it is a best response for uniformed voters, when the Striped candidate is advertising a small number of ads, to vote their party identity. Of those uninformed voters who participated, the majority, 92.17% voted for candidates from their own party in the Red Token treatment and 91.49% did so in the Blue Token treatment. This suggests that the majority 20 of uninformed voters assumed Striped candidates were advertising a small numnber of ads and thus best responded by voting their party identity.
Our second inconsistency with the theoretical predictions on abstention is strong evidence that informed non-candidate voters are "turned o¤" by campaign advertising purchased with Blue Tokens. That is, informed non-candidate voters in the Blue Token treatment are more likely to abstain in the Blue Token treatment than in the Red Token treatment (13.54% compared to 0.94%), which is statistically signifcant [t statistic = 4.91]. This is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction since informed non-candidate voters should vote for the Striped candidate in equilibrium. However, in order to determine better the causes of this higher abstention rate, we need to explore the overall behavior of informed noncandidate voters, which we do next.
Vote Choice Behavior of Informed Voters
We …nd that informed noncandidate voters are signi…cantly in ‡uenced by the information they receive in the Red Token treatment. When the Striped candidate is a member of their own party, they vote for that candidate 87.62% of the time, but when the Striped candidate is a member of the other party, they vote for the other party 82.24% of the time. Table 4 Voters then appear to evaluate Blue Tokens di¤erently from Red Tokens, however, these variables are not signi…cant predictors of abstention decisions. We …nd little evidence of changes in voting behavior over time. 
Candidate Advertising Behavior
We expect that Solid candidates should not advertise. However, given that sometimes voters respond to Solid candidate advertisements as discussed above, we might expect some Solid candidates advertise anyway. Nevertheless, Solid candidates rarely advertise. In the Red Token treatment, only one subject advertised when he or she was assigned to be the Solid candidate.
This subject did so in the …rst period of session 1 and in the 16th period of session 1, where he or she purchased with Red Tokens 26 and 22 advertisements respectively. In the Blue Token treatment two subjects assigned as Solid candidates purchased ads, both in the …rst 10 periods of the experiment, one purchased 27 ads and the other purchased 3 ads. In all other cases, subjects assigned as Solid candidates chose not to purchase advertisements.
Second, we expect Striped candidates to purchase 2 ads. Interestingly, we …nd that Striped candidates advertised signi…cantly more than predicted in both treatments as reported in Table   7 below. This was true regardless of the number of subjects. Blue Token treatment will have negative consequences, "turn o¤"voters. Given that advertising by candidates was excessively more than predicted, we considered whether subjects appeared to "learn" during the experiment to advertise less. Table 7 . This is not surprisingly, since our design discouraged such learning since subjects were typically only candidates once during a session, and at most twice. Table 8 below: 
Concluding Remarks
Much debate exists over whether campaign advertising and the implicit assumption that such advertising is paid by special interest groups causes voters to participate less (turns them o¤) or provides voters with information that then increases their probability of participation (turns them out). In this paper we address this question using laboratory experiments where campaign advertising is endogenous and may or may not be costly to voters. We also compare our results to elections with compulsory voting. We …nd a number of important results that previously have not been explored in the literature.
First, with respect to the e¢ ciency of elections, we …nd that advertising that has no payo¤ consequences to voters is signi…cantly more informationally and economically e¢ cient than advertising with payo¤ consequences. However, we …nd that there is no informational or economic advantage of voluntary over compulsory voting.
Second, with respect to information and voting behavior, we …nd that indeed when advertising is informative and not costly to voters it increases their probability of participation, as has been found in previous studies. However, we …nd that the e¤ect is not nearly as strong as that found in other similar common value voting games. We suggest that the reason for the di¤erence is that voters payo¤s in the common value game are slightly asymmetric and thus voters are induced with a preference over which party should win, even though all voters are paid more when the group chooses the Striped candidate regardless of party. Furthermore, we …nd that when advertising is costly to voters, voters are "turned o¤"by advertising, more likely to abstain, even when informed.
Third, with respect to candidate advertising strategies, we …nd that Striped candidates advertise much more than theoretically predicted, although signi…cantly less so when advertisements are costly to voters, as predicted. However, we also …nd that when advertising is free to voters and voting is voluntary, candidates actually advertise signi…cantly more than when voting is compulsory. Candidates appear to believe that advertising is more necessary when voting is voluntary.
What are the implications for naturally occurring elections and the role of campaign advertising? Our analysis provides some support for the "turned o¤" versus "turned out" trade-o¤ in costly campaign advertising. Although advertising that is informative to voters increases participation, when the advertising is known to have a cost to voters in terms of payo¤s, informed voters are less likely to participate. It also suggests that the e¤ect of information on turnout may not be as strong as hypothesized when voters have party preferences even if the voting game is a common value one.
Finally, our analysis …nds that candidates appear to believe that advertising is more necessary when voting is voluntary than complusory. Candidates appear to advertise excessively in order to motivate voters to turnout when advertising is not costly to voters even though the advertising is costly to the candidates themselves. From our reading of the literature, the relationship between campaign advertising decisions and turnout has not been addressed much by scholars or pundits. Our results suggest that it could be important and worthy of future study.
Appendix A: Experiment Instructions
Welcome to today's experiment! You will be taking part in a decision making study. We are interested in your decisions that you make on your own. That means, now that the experiment has started, you may not talk to anyone except the experimenter. Please turn o¤ all phones, beepers, and any other electronic devices. If you talk or otherwise communicate with another participant during the experiment, or if an electronic device of yours disturbs the experiment, you will be asked to leave and will collect only your show-up bonus. If you have any questions at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand, and we will come to you to answer your question.
VERY IMPORTANT: If you should experience any software problems at all (a program freeze, a system error message, etc.), do not touch the computer. Do not click to close any system error screens. Instead, please raise your hand, and we will assist you.
When you are …nished reading a screen, click the Next button to continue.
For your participation, you will be paid a show-up bonus. You may earn more money during the course of the experiment, as explained in detail below. The experiment will take about two hours. Please remain quiet after the experiment has concluded. Each of you will be called to the experimenter, one-by-one, to be paid your earnings privately. After you have been paid you should exit the lab.
As you proceed through these instructions, there will be a quiz question at the bottom of each page. You must answer the question correctly before going to the next page. When you …nish the instructions, you will play a simulated version of the experiment so that you can thoroughly familiarize yourself with the interface.
In this experiment you will be assigned randomly to the role of either candidate or voter.
Two participants will be candidates, and the rest will be voters. Candidates campaign, and at the end of the campaign voters vote. There will be several campaigns during the experiment, so there is a chance that you will be both a candidate and a voter (there is also a chance that you will be only a voter). Therefore, during these instructions, you will familiarize yourself with both the candidate and the voter interfaces and rules.
Question: How many participants will be candidates during any given campaign?
A: 1 C: 3 B: 2 D: varies from campaign to campaign
Whether you are a candidate or a voter, you will be randomly assigned to a political party.
This experiment is a two-party experiment. The two parties are the Circle Party and the Triangle Party. One candidate will be a Circle candidate, and the other candidate will be a Triangle candidate. There is an even number of voters, so in each campaign half the voters will be Circle party and half will be Triangle party.
You will be randomly reassigned to a party at the beginning of each of the campaigns. Party assignment will not a¤ect your ability to earn payo¤s during the experiment.
Question: If you are a Circle candidate in campaign 1, how many times is it possible for you to be assigned to the Circle party in subsequent campaigns?
A: None C: 1 In addition to the candidates being assigned to a party, they will also be randomly assigned to either Solid or Striped.
The amount you earn in this experiment will depend partly on which candidate wins the election. Your earnings depend on whether the winning candidate belongs to your party, and whether they are a Solid or Striped candidate. Your earnings also depend on the campaign decisions of the winning candidate, as described in detail below.
The campaign proceeds as follows. For 1 minute (marked by a countdown timer in the upper corner of your screen), candidates will campaign. After this, all campaigning will stop, and all participants will vote for their preferred candidate. The voting phase will last for 30 seconds.
Both voters and candidates must vote.
During the campaign phase, voters observe candidates'activity on their computer screens. At the end of the campaign phase, there will be a 30-second voting period. All participants must vote, as discussed previously. Whether you are a candidate or a voter, you will see a voting window which allows you to press a button corresponding to the candidate you wish to vote for.
When you press the button, a message box will appear asking you to con…rm your vote. You will not be able to change your vote once it has been con…rmed, nor can you vote a second time.
The election results will be shown to all participants. You will see the results along with your personal earnings for the campaign.
On the voting screen, the middle window is titled "Abstain." Abstain means simply that you wish to vote for neither candidate. If you mouse over the "Abstain" button and con…rm, your decision will be entered as a "No vote," meaning you voted for neither candidate.
There is no monetary penalty for abstaining. Given the outcome of the election, your earnings are the same whether you voted for Circle, Triangle, or you chose Abstain.
Keep in mind, however, that choosing to vote or to abstain may have an e¤ect on the outcome of the election.
Voters'earnings are calculated in two steps.
The …rst step in calculating voters'earnings is as follows. Candidates' earnings are calculated as follows. Because each candidate wants only their party to win, the …rst two steps are not used to calculate candidates'earnings.
The …rst step in calculating candidate's earnings is as follows.
First, a candidate will earn a bonus of $15 if he/she is elected.
Also, a candidate's earnings are reduced by $0.10 for every advertisement that he/she has purchased.
Candidates do not earn any money from tokens that are not used.
Here While it is possible for you as a candidate to lose money during an individual campaign, your earnings for the experiment will be positive.
You have now learned how the entire campaign process works for both voters and for can-
didates. There will be multiple campaigns in the experiment. Before each campaign begins, an information screen will be displayed for you. This screen will tell you what tokens are available for the upcoming campaign, whether you are a voter or a candidate, your party a¢ liation, and, if you are a candidate, whether you are stripes or solids. These characteristics will be randomly reassigned each campaign. At the conclusion of the …nal campaign, a summary screen will display your total earnings including your show-up fee.
Please sit quietly after the experiment has concluded and wait to be called to receive your earnings.
You will now go through three practice screens: …rst the Candidate screen, second the Voter screen, and third the Voting screen. Screens will display for 1 minute each. Practice clicking the di¤erent buttons in the window to see how the interface works.
Click the <Finished> button to begin the practice screens.
Appendix B: Solution of Uninformed Voters'Equilibrium Choices
Proof of Lemma 1
Uninformed voters condition their votes on the case when they are pivotal. An uninformed voter is pivotal when one of the candidates is losing by one vote and they can force a tie election or when there is a tie election. Let P 0 be the event when there is a tie among the other voters between A and B; and P for = A; B, which is the event in which policy is losing by one vote among the other voters. To demonstrate that uninformed voters …nd it optimal to abstain when informed voters choose the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world and candidates purchase at least one ad, we calculate the expected utility of an A type voter given that all uninformed voters are abstaining and demonstrate that abstention is also this voter's optimal choice for any amount of campaign advertising. To calculate these expected utilities, we …rst calculate the pivot probabilities.
With an even number of voters and two voters as candidates who always vote for themselves, that informed voters vote for the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world, and all other uninformed voters abstain, we can compute the pivot probabilities for an uninformed
A type voter as follows:
Consider Pr(P 0 jA). This probability is nonzero only if no other noncandidate voter has seen an ad. If another noncandidate voter has seen an ad, he or she will vote A and A will win by one vote. Similarly for Pr(P 0 jB). Thus these probabilities are equivalent to the probability that no noncandidate voter sees an ad as follows:
Consider Pr(P A jA). This probability always equals zero. Why? If there are zero ads or all ads are seen by candidate voters, then there is a tie. If any uninformed voter sees an ad, he or she will vote for A and A will win. So this probability equals zero. It also follows that Pr(P B jB) = 0.
Consider Pr(P A jB). This probability is nonzero if exactly one noncandidate voter sees all ads. What is that probability?
It also follows that Pr(P B jA) = Pr(P A jB):
We assume that our uninformed type A voter will choose the option that gives him or her the highest expected utility. It is clear that for all values of ; n; and m, u A (A) > u B (A) :
Hence the relevant issue is which is greater, u A (A) or u ; (A) : The di¤erence between these two expected utilities is given by: Similarly, we can show that for an uninformed type B voter the same relationship holds.
Note also that for the value of used in our experiments, = 0:14; and the number of voters used in the experiments, n = 22 and n = 24; for all values of m > 0, abstaining is an optimal response.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider an uninformed A type voter in the A party. Assume that all informed voters are voting for the candidate whose identity matches the state of the world and all other uninformed voters are voting for the candidate whose identity matches their type. Uninformed voters condition their vote on the relative pivot probabilities as in Lemma 1.
Pr(P 0 ji) = 0 since n is even and there are n 1 other voters thus if everyone is voting, there is no possibility of a tie election.:
Pr (P A jA) is the probability that given that A is the true state and one A type is not voting We can now incorporate these probabilities into the expected utilities as in our proof of Lemma 1 above. As in Lemma 1, for all values of ; n; and m, u A (A) > u B (A) but whether abstention or voting type is an optimal response depends on the values of ; n; and m as follows: The dotted line in the …gure shows the value of , 0.14, which was used in our experiments. Notice that for the number of voters used in our experiments, the number of ads must be less than 3 or 4 for an uninformed voter to optimally best response by voting his or her type. That is, for n = 22 when m < 3; voting identity is optimal, but for m 3, abstaining is an optimal choice and for n = 24 when m < 4; voting identity is optimal, but for m 4, abstaining is an optimal choice. turnout by decreasing the cynicism supposedly caused by privatedly …nanced politics." Will then goes on to contend that there is no evidence to support this view held by reformers. 4 Note that this is a di¤erent issue from the debate over whether negative advertising does or does not mobilize voters. The argued link we are referring to is that the size of extensive campaign contributions reduces the desire for voters to participate in the electoral process regardless of whether the monies are used for positive or negative campaign advertising because the size of expenditures suggests to voters that candidates are making choices that bene…t special interest groups (and not voters). In the experiments described in this paper, all advertising is positive. 5 For the argument that compulsory voting would be bene…cial to democracy see Lijphart (1997) and for a recent theoretical study that discusses potential problems see Jakee (2006). 6 We used a "mouse-over"technology for subjects to make choices so that subjects could not 40 identify when other subjects were making choices by hearing clicking, which was important to ensure that candidate identities were anonymous. Subjects were given in depth training in 5 practice sessions (2 interactive) using the mouse-over technology before subjects participated in the paid portion of the experiment 7 Ashworth justi…es this assumption on page 56 with the argument that the opposing candidate can always uncover lies, and that some news organizations, like CNN, do fact-checking. 8 The value of the t statistic is 2.23. 9 The t statistic is 5.05 for this comparison. Tokens is 0.25 and under Blue Tokens is 1.31. 12 The t statistic for this comparison with Red Tokens is 0.82 and for Blue Tokens is 0.74. 13 These instructions are written for a more general experiment than we conducted where candidates may be able to puchase ads from di¤erent types of tokens simultaneously. However, in our experiment candidates either would be able to purchase from red or blue tokens only.
Voters always knew which token was being used to purchase the ad because the information screen at the beginning of the session informed them as is clear from later in these instructions.
